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    <title>morty@home - Security</title>
    <link>http://blog.morty.info/</link>
    <description>The Future is a Mix of Violet and Blue</description>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <copyright>morty</copyright>
    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 15 Jan 2009 18:35:06 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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      <pingback:target>http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=58903296-1529-4208-8828-06b46820b407</pingback:target>
      <dc:creator>Morten Abrahamsen</dc:creator>
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        <p>
Interesting point by <a href="http://akselvoll.net/blog/2009/01/15/dep-is-useless/">Magnus
Akselvoll</a>.
</p>
        <p>
Perhaps two of the most malware-facing application are the ones that don’t quite work.
Enough said.
</p>
      </body>
      <title>DEP is useless?</title>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=58903296-1529-4208-8828-06b46820b407</guid>
      <link>http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=58903296-1529-4208-8828-06b46820b407</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 15 Jan 2009 18:35:06 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;
Interesting point by &lt;a href="http://akselvoll.net/blog/2009/01/15/dep-is-useless/"&gt;Magnus
Akselvoll&lt;/a&gt;.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Perhaps two of the most malware-facing application are the ones that don’t quite work.
Enough said.
&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <comments>http://blog.morty.info/CommentView.aspx?guid=58903296-1529-4208-8828-06b46820b407</comments>
      <category>Security</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <trackback:ping>http://blog.morty.info/Trackback.aspx?guid=91817476-8f30-46a1-bb1e-c84d8313bb58</trackback:ping>
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      <pingback:target>http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=91817476-8f30-46a1-bb1e-c84d8313bb58</pingback:target>
      <dc:creator>Morten Abrahamsen</dc:creator>
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        <p>
          <a href="http://www.phreedom.org/research/rogue-ca/">Security researchers</a> have
proven a successful collision attack against MD5-signed X.509 certificates. This would
enable an attacker to create their own X.509 certificate with same digital signature
as the original certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign additional
certificates and provide whatever details they please, all trusted by existing security
infrastructures. This will work great phishing and man-in-the-middle attacks.
</p>
        <p>
This was performed using a cluster of 200 PlayStation 3’s and is reproducible with
a couple of days of computing.
</p>
        <p>
The risks inherent when using the MD5 hash algorithm have been known for quite some
time and the recommendation is to move to the SHA family. Most certificates should
as such be signed with SHA-1 instead of MD5, but history has proven that there are
always old installations and old configurations around.
</p>
        <p>
The following public Certificate Authorities are still using MD5 signing:
</p>
        <ul>
          <ul>
            <li>
RapidSSL 
</li>
            <li>
FreeSSL 
</li>
            <li>
TrustCenter 
</li>
            <li>
RSA Data Security 
</li>
            <li>
Thawte 
</li>
            <li>
verisign.co.jp</li>
          </ul>
        </ul>
        <p>
The security researchers sampled 30.000 certificates, whereof 9.000 were using MD5
and 97% of those were issued by RapidSSL.
</p>
        <p>
It’s time to review the algorithm used on your certificates; hopefully it is using
SHA. This is easily verifiable if you look at the certificate properties. This is
not a problem with EV certificates as they do not support the MD5 algorithm.
</p>
        <p>
Microsoft recently issued <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/961509.mspx">this</a> security
advisory.
</p>
      </body>
      <title>MD5-signed X.509 certificates in trouble</title>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=91817476-8f30-46a1-bb1e-c84d8313bb58</guid>
      <link>http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=91817476-8f30-46a1-bb1e-c84d8313bb58</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2008 10:25:26 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;
&lt;a href="http://www.phreedom.org/research/rogue-ca/"&gt;Security researchers&lt;/a&gt; have
proven a successful collision attack against MD5-signed X.509 certificates. This would
enable an attacker to create their own X.509 certificate with same digital signature
as the original certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign additional
certificates and provide whatever details they please, all trusted by existing security
infrastructures. This will work great phishing and man-in-the-middle attacks.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
This was performed using a cluster of 200 PlayStation 3’s and is reproducible with
a couple of days of computing.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
The risks inherent when using the MD5 hash algorithm have been known for quite some
time and the recommendation is to move to the SHA family. Most certificates should
as such be signed with SHA-1 instead of MD5, but history has proven that there are
always old installations and old configurations around.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
The following public Certificate Authorities are still using MD5 signing:
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
RapidSSL 
&lt;li&gt;
FreeSSL 
&lt;li&gt;
TrustCenter 
&lt;li&gt;
RSA Data Security 
&lt;li&gt;
Thawte 
&lt;li&gt;
verisign.co.jp&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
The security researchers sampled 30.000 certificates, whereof 9.000 were using MD5
and 97% of those were issued by RapidSSL.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
It’s time to review the algorithm used on your certificates; hopefully it is using
SHA. This is easily verifiable if you look at the certificate properties. This is
not a problem with EV certificates as they do not support the MD5 algorithm.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Microsoft recently issued &lt;a href="http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/961509.mspx"&gt;this&lt;/a&gt; security
advisory.
&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <comments>http://blog.morty.info/CommentView.aspx?guid=91817476-8f30-46a1-bb1e-c84d8313bb58</comments>
      <category>Security</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <trackback:ping>http://blog.morty.info/Trackback.aspx?guid=adb4873c-e2ec-4010-bfe9-9e3bf5808ee0</trackback:ping>
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      <dc:creator>Morten Abrahamsen</dc:creator>
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      <slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>
Norton Labs have created a utility that removes a lot the UAC annoyances you may be
experiencing in Windows Vista. It allows you to configure a list of applications that
can be launched in admin mode without incurring a UAC prompt, basically a “do not
ask me again” dialog. Great for everyday applications like Visual Studio.
</p>
        <p>
May be a better solution than disabling it completely ;)
</p>
        <p>
There is one caveat though, it will send information to Norton whenever you get a
prompt. It will send the filename and hash of the files involved, as well as your
response. The intention is to create a white list that will be shipped with the finished
product.
</p>
        <p>
There is a free beta version and a FAQ available at <a href="http://www.nortonlabs.com/inthelab/uac.php">Norton
Labs</a>, both X86 and X64 editions.
</p>
      </body>
      <title>Tired of all the UAC prompts?</title>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=adb4873c-e2ec-4010-bfe9-9e3bf5808ee0</guid>
      <link>http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=adb4873c-e2ec-4010-bfe9-9e3bf5808ee0</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 12 Oct 2008 10:23:59 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;
Norton Labs have created a utility that removes a lot the UAC annoyances you may be
experiencing in Windows Vista. It allows you to configure a list of applications that
can be launched in admin mode without incurring a UAC prompt, basically a “do not
ask me again” dialog. Great for everyday applications like Visual Studio.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
May be a better solution than disabling it completely ;)
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
There is one caveat though, it will send information to Norton whenever you get a
prompt. It will send the filename and hash of the files involved, as well as your
response. The intention is to create a white list that will be shipped with the finished
product.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
There is a free beta version and a FAQ available at &lt;a href="http://www.nortonlabs.com/inthelab/uac.php"&gt;Norton
Labs&lt;/a&gt;, both X86 and X64 editions.
&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <comments>http://blog.morty.info/CommentView.aspx?guid=adb4873c-e2ec-4010-bfe9-9e3bf5808ee0</comments>
      <category>Security</category>
      <category>Tools</category>
    </item>
    <item>
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      <dc:creator>Morten Abrahamsen</dc:creator>
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      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>
It is great to see that someone has a taken an interest in the WSE compression filters
I’ve been working on. <a href="http://blog.morty.info/CommentView.aspx?guid=656acbe3-f10e-4969-a917-b4fe3d5ecccd">Rodolfo
Finochietti</a> has added several new features to the code base. 
</p>
        <p>
        </p>
        <li>
Compress attachments 
</li>
        <li>
More algorithms (Deflate, Zip) 
</li>
        <li>
Compression level (set through compression context) 
</li>
        <li>
Threshold. Compresses according to the minimum message size (body size plus all attachments
size) 
</li>
        <li>
Several other improvements and code cleaning. 
<p></p><p>
This is really exciting news. Great work Rodolfo!
</p><p>
You find a list of download links <a href="http://weblogs.asp.net/andresv/archive/2004/09/14/229647.aspx">here</a>,
or you can download it directly from this <a href="http://prototypes.shockbyte.com.ar/PO-WSCompression2.zip">link</a>. 
</p></li>
      </body>
      <title>WSE: Another Compression Filters Update!</title>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=6519d2c8-e48b-4c24-afc2-6e949f9d2c30</guid>
      <link>http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=6519d2c8-e48b-4c24-afc2-6e949f9d2c30</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 16 Sep 2004 19:55:39 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;
It is great to see that someone has a taken an interest in the WSE compression filters
I&amp;#8217;ve been working on. &lt;a href="http://blog.morty.info/CommentView.aspx?guid=656acbe3-f10e-4969-a917-b4fe3d5ecccd"&gt;Rodolfo
Finochietti&lt;/a&gt; has added several new features to the code base. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
Compress attachments 
&lt;li&gt;
More algorithms (Deflate, Zip) 
&lt;li&gt;
Compression level (set through compression context) 
&lt;li&gt;
Threshold. Compresses according to the minimum message size (body size plus all attachments
size) 
&lt;li&gt;
Several other improvements and code cleaning. 
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
This is really exciting news. Great work Rodolfo!
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
You find a list of download links &lt;a href="http://weblogs.asp.net/andresv/archive/2004/09/14/229647.aspx"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;,
or you can download it directly from this &lt;a href="http://prototypes.shockbyte.com.ar/PO-WSCompression2.zip"&gt;link&lt;/a&gt;. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;</description>
      <comments>http://blog.morty.info/CommentView.aspx?guid=6519d2c8-e48b-4c24-afc2-6e949f9d2c30</comments>
      <category>Security</category>
      <category>Tools</category>
      <category>WSE</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <trackback:ping>http://blog.morty.info/Trackback.aspx?guid=6465a916-c80c-48b6-88b8-3cb29db46131</trackback:ping>
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      <pingback:target>http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=6465a916-c80c-48b6-88b8-3cb29db46131</pingback:target>
      <dc:creator>Morten Abrahamsen</dc:creator>
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      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>
          <a href="http://www.w3.org/Submission/2004/SUBM-ws-addressing-20040810/">WS-Addressing</a>,
a vital piece of XML Web Services infrastructure, has just been submitted to the <a href="http://www.w3.org/">W3C</a>.
</p>
        <p>
With <a href="http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/wss">WS-Security</a> being an official <a href="http://www.oasis-open.org">OASIS</a> standard,
and WS-Addressing entering the <a href="http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Process">W3C
standardization process</a>, we may soon be looking at the first stable set of advanced
web services infrastructure. 
</p>
        <p>
These two specifications form the foundation of the <a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/webservices/building/wse/">Microsoft
Web Services Enhancements</a> toolkit's functionality. Perhaps we will soon say goodbye
to backwards incompatibility and short support lifecycles in this particular area.
</p>
        <p>
As always, it is great fun to follow the advances.
</p>
      </body>
      <title>WS-Addressing makes its way to W3C</title>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=6465a916-c80c-48b6-88b8-3cb29db46131</guid>
      <link>http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=6465a916-c80c-48b6-88b8-3cb29db46131</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Aug 2004 20:23:12 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;
&lt;a href="http://www.w3.org/Submission/2004/SUBM-ws-addressing-20040810/"&gt;WS-Addressing&lt;/a&gt;,
a vital piece of XML Web Services infrastructure, has just been submitted to the &lt;a href="http://www.w3.org/"&gt;W3C&lt;/a&gt;.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
With &lt;a href="http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/wss"&gt;WS-Security&lt;/a&gt; being an official &lt;a href="http://www.oasis-open.org"&gt;OASIS&lt;/a&gt; standard,
and WS-Addressing entering the &lt;a href="http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Process"&gt;W3C
standardization process&lt;/a&gt;, we may soon be looking at the first stable set of advanced
web services infrastructure. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
These two specifications form the foundation of the &lt;a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/webservices/building/wse/"&gt;Microsoft
Web Services Enhancements&lt;/a&gt; toolkit's functionality. Perhaps we will soon say goodbye
to backwards incompatibility and short support lifecycles in this particular area.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
As always, it is great fun to follow the advances.
&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <comments>http://blog.morty.info/CommentView.aspx?guid=6465a916-c80c-48b6-88b8-3cb29db46131</comments>
      <category>Architecture</category>
      <category>Indigo</category>
      <category>Security</category>
      <category>WSE</category>
    </item>
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      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>
We have been doing a lot of WSE testing at work while developing our new integration
infrastructure. As a part of this project we have built a filter for message level
compression in WSE.
</p>
        <p>
One of the interesting things we found out while performance testing the solution
was the speed increase resulting from message compression. The system we are building
transfers sensitive data across the internet and we are using X509 certificates for
integrity and confidentiality. Naturally, we had to apply the compression before the
security mechanisms were invoked, as compressing encrypted data isn’t efficient
at all. However compressing xml data is very efficient; often resulting in 80% smaller
message bodies.
</p>
        <p>
Having a smaller message body means that the encryption and signing process has a
lot less data to deal with, and this reduced the processing time significantly. We
did of course consider that the smaller payload would increase transfer performance,
but on our test-setup this was not a issue.
</p>
        <p>
The bottom line is that our initial testing shows that the gzip compression algorithm
is faster than the encryption and signing process used by WSE. This came as a surprise
to us as signing involves hashing and the encryption implementation uses a block cipher,
and neither of these should have performance issues with large amounts of data; at
least not compared to a compression algorithm!
</p>
        <p>
This topic requires a bit more research before I can reach a conclusion, but so far
I am a bit surprised. On the other hand, the results we are seeing could be related
to some other part of the process like the normalization algorithm.
</p>
        <p>
Having fun ;)
</p>
      </body>
      <title>WSE: Compression, Security and Performance</title>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=e6579beb-6256-47b0-babf-f6ad409df647</guid>
      <link>http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=e6579beb-6256-47b0-babf-f6ad409df647</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 15 Feb 2004 20:16:33 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;
We have been doing a lot of WSE testing at work while developing our new integration
infrastructure. As a part of this project we have built a filter for message level
compression in WSE.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
One of the interesting things we found out while performance testing the solution
was the speed increase resulting from message compression. The system we are building
transfers sensitive data across the internet and we are using X509 certificates for
integrity and confidentiality. Naturally, we had to apply the compression before the
security mechanisms were invoked, as compressing encrypted data isn&amp;#8217;t efficient
at all. However compressing xml data is very efficient; often resulting in 80% smaller
message bodies.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Having a smaller message body means that the encryption and signing process has a
lot less data to deal with, and this reduced the processing time significantly. We
did of course consider that the smaller payload would increase transfer performance,
but on our test-setup this was not a issue.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
The bottom line is that our initial testing shows that the gzip compression algorithm
is faster than the encryption and signing process used by WSE. This came as a surprise
to us as signing involves hashing and the encryption implementation uses a block cipher,
and neither of these should have performance issues with large amounts of data; at
least not compared to a compression algorithm!
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
This topic requires a bit more research before I can reach a conclusion, but so far
I am a bit surprised. On the other hand, the results we are seeing could be related
to some other part of the process like the normalization algorithm.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Having fun ;)
&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <comments>http://blog.morty.info/CommentView.aspx?guid=e6579beb-6256-47b0-babf-f6ad409df647</comments>
      <category>Security</category>
      <category>WSE</category>
    </item>
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        <p>
I read and hear that increased performance is one of the primary reasons for employing
secure conversation instead of PKI and X509 certificates. Usually these statements
are based upon the fact that PKI encryption is relatively slow. This becomes a problem
when large amounts of data are involved because the encryption algorithm used with
X509 certificates is not a block cipher. 
</p>
        <p>
I am not going to give an exhaustive explanation of how block ciphers work, but just
note that they scale very well as it’s usually just the first block that is
encrypted and then a chaining algorithm is applied to transform the next blocks based
on the encrypted output of the first block. The asymmetric algorithm used by X509
certificates splits the data up into chunks of the maximum allowed size and then encrypts
each one of them before chaining the encrypted blocks together. Moving back to the
topic at hand I would like to shed some light on the statement about performance and
secure conversation.
</p>
        <p>
If you use an X509 certificate to encrypt a message using WSE a symmetric key is generated.
This symmetric key is then used to encrypt the specified parts of the message. Finally,
it is this session key that is encrypted with the X509 certificate. This means that
the asymmetric PKI encryption is only used to encrypt a small key, and never the entire
document. As a result, the scalability of the asymmetric PKI encryption isn’t
really a big performance issue when used in this way.
</p>
        <p>
There is an overhead involved in generating and encrypting a new symmetric key for
each message, but how this affects the overall performance of your system depends
upon your architecture and distribution. I would think it would be a non-issue for
most internet-based applications. 
</p>
        <p>
There is of course also an overhead involved when initiating a secure conversation
as trust must be validated and the session key must be generated and distributed.
As a result, the amount of messages exchanged within each conversation becomes an
important factor when deciding on the performance impact.
</p>
        <p>
If you don’t need client authentication you may also use the secure conversation
session key to ensure integrity, and that will shave some cycles off using X509 certificates
for digital signatures.
</p>
        <p>
There are in other words performance concerns when using either one of these security
strategies, and which one is the fastest depends upon your architecture and usage
patterns.
</p>
      </body>
      <title>WSE, Secure Conversation and Performance</title>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=6af4be3d-5535-4e96-9a1b-142e93c52171</guid>
      <link>http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=6af4be3d-5535-4e96-9a1b-142e93c52171</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Jan 2004 15:04:42 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;
I read and hear that increased performance is one of the primary reasons for employing
secure conversation instead of PKI and X509 certificates. Usually these statements
are based upon the fact that PKI encryption is relatively slow. This becomes a problem
when large amounts of data are involved because the encryption algorithm used with
X509 certificates is not a block cipher. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
I am not going to give an exhaustive explanation of how block ciphers work, but just
note that they scale very well as it&amp;#8217;s usually just the first block that is
encrypted and then a chaining algorithm is applied to transform the next blocks based
on the encrypted output of the first block. The asymmetric algorithm used by X509
certificates splits the data up into chunks of the maximum allowed size and then encrypts
each one of them before chaining the encrypted blocks together. Moving back to the
topic at hand I would like to shed some light on the statement about performance and
secure conversation.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
If you use an X509 certificate to encrypt a message using WSE a symmetric key is generated.
This symmetric key is then used to encrypt the specified parts of the message. Finally,
it is this session key that is encrypted with the X509 certificate. This means that
the asymmetric PKI encryption is only used to encrypt a small key, and never the entire
document. As a result, the scalability of the asymmetric PKI encryption isn&amp;#8217;t
really a big performance issue when used in this way.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
There is an overhead involved in generating and encrypting a new symmetric key for
each message, but how this affects the overall performance of your system depends
upon your architecture and distribution. I would think it would be a non-issue for
most internet-based applications. 
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
There is of course also an overhead involved when initiating a secure conversation
as trust must be validated and the session key must be generated and distributed.
As a result, the amount of messages exchanged within each conversation becomes an
important factor when deciding on the performance impact.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
If you don&amp;#8217;t need client authentication you may also use the secure conversation
session key to ensure integrity, and that will shave some cycles off using X509 certificates
for digital signatures.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
There are in other words performance concerns when using either one of these security
strategies, and which one is the fastest depends upon your architecture and usage
patterns.
&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <comments>http://blog.morty.info/CommentView.aspx?guid=6af4be3d-5535-4e96-9a1b-142e93c52171</comments>
      <category>Security</category>
      <category>WSE</category>
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        <p>
I have spent a lot time with WSE 2.0 in the last few weeks, and as both my code and
my mindset moves from testing and research to building production quality systems,
I am beginning to think about how hard it is to get the security choices right with
WSE 2.0.
</p>
        <p>
From a practical point of view, the move from plain ASP.NET Web Services to WSE and
WS-Security is about moving from the SSL checkbox in IIS to a fairly imperative and
challenging programming model in WSE 2.0. While the SSL-checkbox is inflexible and
does not provide you with a lot of room for configuration, it is reasonably simple
to get right. The WSE toolkit on the other hand provides you with a lot of room for
mistakes and bad decisions. Throw a bit of WS-SecureConversation and WS-Trust into
the mix and things really start to get interesting.
</p>
        <p>
Even though WSE is an advanced toolkit for early adopters, it is still being marketed
and generally perceived as the technology that will ensure secure web services. In
the real world, it needs to be easy to build secure services. This is not because
security is a simple concept to grasp, as it in fact is hugely complex, but because
it is a basic requirement in any software project. We need to be practical and provide
solutions that by default are as close to bulletproof as we can get them.
</p>
        <p>
Looking at the samples in the WSE 2.0 TP distribution, I fail to find one that ensures
integrity and confidentially for both the request and the response in a message exchange,
but I have not done an exhaustive search. Given the affection that exists for copy
and paste development, I am scared of what will travel from and to web services in
the next couple of years.
</p>
        <p>
I know that making the move to WSE is about a lot more than just migrating from SSL/
TLS to the WS-x family, but I think that it will be one of the most common scenarios.
</p>
        <p>
My current thinking is that I would not recommend using WSE unless you have a very
strong understanding of security and you have a dire need for the functionality it
provides.
</p>
        <p>
This entry seems a bit negative towards WSE, but I assure you that it is a great toolkit
with a lot of good stuff in it. My concern is with whether or not the migration from
SSL checkbox security to WSE-security is an evolution that will increase security
or be a great source for error and confusion. Simple end-to-end samples together with
practical prescriptive guidance may be a viable path towards solving this problem.
</p>
        <p>
I am just in the beginning of forming my opinions on this topic; perhaps they will
change.
</p>
      </body>
      <title>WSE and the Next Generation of Security</title>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=ef65e7bb-416e-4f65-87ae-8e42981764bb</guid>
      <link>http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=ef65e7bb-416e-4f65-87ae-8e42981764bb</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2003 01:38:20 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;
I have spent a lot time with WSE 2.0 in the last few weeks, and as both my code and
my mindset moves from testing and research to building production quality systems,
I am beginning to think about how hard it is to get the security choices right with
WSE 2.0.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
From a practical point of view, the move from plain ASP.NET Web Services to WSE and
WS-Security is about moving from the SSL checkbox in IIS to a fairly imperative and
challenging programming model in WSE 2.0. While the SSL-checkbox is inflexible and
does not provide you with a lot of room for configuration, it is reasonably simple
to get right. The WSE toolkit on the other hand provides you with a lot of room for
mistakes and bad decisions. Throw a bit of WS-SecureConversation and WS-Trust into
the mix and things really start to get interesting.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Even though WSE is an advanced toolkit for early adopters, it is still being marketed
and generally perceived as the technology that will ensure secure web services. In
the real world, it needs to be easy to build secure services. This is not because
security is a simple concept to grasp, as it in fact is hugely complex, but because
it is a basic requirement in any software project. We need to be practical and provide
solutions that by default are as close to bulletproof as we can get them.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
Looking at the samples in the WSE 2.0 TP distribution, I fail to find one that ensures
integrity and confidentially for both the request and the response in a message exchange,
but I have not done an exhaustive search. Given the affection that exists for copy
and paste development, I am scared of what will travel from and to web services in
the next couple of years.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
I know that making the move to WSE is about a lot more than just migrating from SSL/
TLS to the WS-x family, but I think that it will be one of the most common scenarios.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
My current thinking is that I would not recommend using WSE unless you have a very
strong understanding of security and you have a dire need for the functionality it
provides.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
This entry seems a bit negative towards WSE, but I assure you that it is a great toolkit
with a lot of good stuff in it. My concern is with whether or not the migration from
SSL checkbox security to WSE-security is an evolution that will increase security
or be a great source for error and confusion. Simple end-to-end samples together with
practical prescriptive guidance may be a viable path towards solving this problem.
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
I am just in the beginning of forming my opinions on this topic; perhaps they will
change.
&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <comments>http://blog.morty.info/CommentView.aspx?guid=ef65e7bb-416e-4f65-87ae-8e42981764bb</comments>
      <category>Security</category>
      <category>WSE</category>
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        <p xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
          <a href="http://www.develop.com/kbrown/">Keith Brown</a> (Mr. Windows Security) has
written an interesting <a href="http://www.develop.com/kbrown/book/html/lifestyle.html">piece</a> about
developer lifestyles in relation to security. Definitely worth a read!
</p>
      </body>
      <title>Developer Lifestyles</title>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=a52998bf-29c9-4424-b519-88a5ca611472</guid>
      <link>http://blog.morty.info/PermaLink.aspx?guid=a52998bf-29c9-4424-b519-88a5ca611472</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Dec 2002 18:21:48 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"&gt;
&lt;a href="http://www.develop.com/kbrown/"&gt;Keith Brown&lt;/a&gt; (Mr. Windows Security) has
written an interesting &lt;a href="http://www.develop.com/kbrown/book/html/lifestyle.html"&gt;piece&lt;/a&gt; about
developer lifestyles in relation to security. Definitely worth a read!
&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <comments>http://blog.morty.info/CommentView.aspx?guid=a52998bf-29c9-4424-b519-88a5ca611472</comments>
      <category>Security</category>
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